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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-ooOooEDWIN 0. GOSSNER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 15679
DAIRY!VIEN ASSOCIATES, INC., a
corporation, E. ODELL SUJ:VIMERS,
ORVAL E. PETERSEN, Defendants
and Respondents, and BERKELEY
BANK FOR COOPERATIVES, a corporation,
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-ooOoo-

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an interpleader action by plaintiff, WHEREIN plaintiff
tendered into court the amount of $31,635.29, and wherein the DefendantsRespondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval E. Petersen, and the DefendantAppellant, Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives claimed an interest in the
money tendered.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Berkeley Bank's Motions for a Directed Verdict and for Judgment

N~t

withstanding the Verdict were denied, and the jury entered a verdict in
favor of the Defendants-Respondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval E. Petersen, and the court entered a Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in accordance therewith.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant, Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives, seeks a reversal of the trial court judgment and for judgment in its favor, as a
matter of law, to the effect that its security interest in the Defendant
Dairymen Associates' accounts receivable, entitles it to the monies tendered into court by the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant-Appellant, Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives, (hereinafter Berkeley Bank) is a corporation, incorporated under the laws of
the United states of America.

on March 26, 1975, the defendant, Dairy-

illen Associates, Inc., (hereinafter Dairymen) DBA Heber Valley Milk Co·
delivered to Berkeley Bank, two promissory
SJ3,J,JOO.OO

~an<.

~ s
no~e

in the amounts of

(EX. 9 ) and $180,000.00 (EX. 10) both payable to Berkeley

Dalr:men defaulted on these notes and subsequently filed BankSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-J_-

ruptcy in the United States District Court for the District of Utah

' 1 Se

central Division, on or about January 17, 1976.

(T. 55).

,

As security for the payment of these notes, Dairymen executed

we

I

ana

delivered to Berkeley Bank a security agreement (EX.ll) wherein Dair;·i ag
men granted to Berkeley Bank a security interest in personal property

I tr

of Dairymen, including a security interest in "all of debtor's accoun

th

1
presentl!j me

(as the term is defined in the Utah Uniform Commercial Code)

existing or hereafter arising, including but not limited to accounts rj Nc
inai~

se

Secretary~

th

required~

ar

ceivable." (EX.ll) Berkeley Bank perfected its security interest
"accounts" including accounts receivable by filing with the
State on February 21, 1975, a financing statement (EX.l2)

as

the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.

Nc

The defendant, Dairymen Associates, Inc. was an agriculture co-~

0,

operative having been accepted as such by the United States Departmen: ac
of Agriculture on or about March 1, 1974 (T.38).

Dairymen had specii;j p1

authority from its Board of Directors to enter into the loan with
Berkeley Bank.

(T.38).

The purpose of this cooperative •.vas to market milk for producer;

A

(dairy farmers) ·.vithout being subject to federal price controls. (?) Cl
I

The Defendants-Respondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval E. Petersen,·d
producers for Dairymen Associates and received checks directly from
men for their milk which was produced for the cooperative.

c:

d

They rec;.l

checks from Dairymen until November of 1975, after which Dairymen teO
nated doing business and filed Bankruptcy in January, 1976.

Both ·.;r.

Summers and Hr. Petersen received payment for their milk directly fr:·
Dairymen.

However, checks payable to 0<\r. Summers and r·lr. Petersen-
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D
o

september, October and November, 1975, failed to clear the bank and
' were returned for insufficient funds.

JI

Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen thereafter filed separate lawsuits

:;·I against Dairymen in Weber County.

:y

I troduced

Copies of the complaints were in-

at trial as Exhibits 14 and 28.

Jn:l these complaints are identical.

Except for the amounts claimed,

Both Summers and Petersen allege Dairy-

tl)j men owed them money for milk delivered to Dairymen between September and

5(1 November, 1975.

aij

As a separate cause of action, both Summers and Peter-

sen asked that Gossner Cheese Co. be restrained from paying Dairymen for

ry ~ their milk which was delivered through Dairymen Associates, Inc.

:r;

, ·,\:0

Summers

and Petersen prayed for judgment against Dairymen for the amounts owed.
No allegations were made that Gessner Cheese Co. or Edwin 0. Gossner
owed them any money for this milk.

In fact, any claims of Respondents

against Gessner Cheese Co. and Edwin 0. Gessner, were dismissed with
prejudice by stipulation of the Respondents. (EX. 17, 20&31).
Thereafter, judgments by default were entered against Dairymen
Associates in the amounts prayed on December 5, 1975. (EX.l5 and 29).
Also on December 5, 1975, \"'rits of Garnishment were issued to Gessner
Cheese Company.

(EX.l6 and 30).

These writs were served on Gessner

Cheese Co. on December 16, 1975.
In its Answers to Interrogatories to Garnishee, Gessner Cheese Co.

ec;.l

stated that Gessner Cheese co. was not indebted to Dairymen Associates,

ter:l

but that Edwin o. Gessner in his individual capacity was indebted to

~r.

Da1rymen Associates in the amount of $31,635.29 for milk supplied to

fr:·

edwin

.J.

Gessner by Dairymen.
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Berkeley Bank notified Gessner that it had a security interest
in Dairymen's accounts receivable and requested that Gessner pay the

i

money owed to Dairymen directly to them,

I

(R.4).

Because of these con-[

flicting claims between Berkeley Bank and Summers
of their Writs of Garnishments), Edwin

o.

&

Petersen (by virtue\

Gessner filed a complaint b

interpleader against Berkeley Bank, Dairymen and summers and Petersen
dated December 31, 1975. (R.03), wherein he admitted owing the sum of
$31,635.29 for milk he purchased from Dairymen Associates, Inc.

(~0~1

I

(T.l35-136).

Dairymen sent statements to Gessner for milk delivered in October!
These statements were for milk

de-l

livered to Gassner by Dairymen Associates for the last 15 days of

/

October and the first 15 days of November, 1975 (T.44).

I

and November, 1975.

(EX.5 and 6).

I

The amount

tendered into court by Gessner is based on these two statements (T-llt!
The total due for both bills was $32,410.79.

Mr. Gassner had two

sufficient funds checks from Dairymen in the amount of $355.14
$420.36 or a total of $775.50.

in-\

a~

I

This amount was subtracted from the

toal due of $32,410.79 for a net amount owed to Dairymen of S31.63S.ii,
which is the amount tendered by Mr. Gassner.

(T.l36).

!

On or about January 19, 1976, Dairymen filed Bankruptcy (T.551 d
listed both Summers and Petersen on Bankruptcy Schedule A-3 as credtt:1
of Dairymen having unsecured claims.

(EX. 7 and 3).
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ARGUMENT

st
I

POINT

the I

I
COn· I

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR
A NEW TRIAL.

virtue\

At the close of the evidence Appellant's counsel moved the Court

rsen

for a directed verdict in its favor on the basis that the Respondents

m of

R.OII

failed to meet their respective burdens of proof (T.207) and upon the

I fact
I

:tober I
: de·

Court would not hear this motion until after he instructed the jury
and sent them to deliberate (T.206), and thereafter denied the motion

I

I (T.210).

I of
mt

that issues raised at this trial were res judicata. (T. 210). The

I

The court thereafter entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions

Law and Judgment on November 28, 1977.

The Appellant filed its

Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a New Trial on

(T-llt I

: December 7, 1977.
(R.239). The Court denied these motions and entered
) in- \
a Memorandum Decision January 17, 1978, (R.267) and an Order Denying
Appellants' Motions on January 27, 1978.

the

(R. 268).

The trial court erred

tn denying these motions for the following reasons:

63S.ii,

!
55)

d

redtt:1

POINT IA
THE MONEY TENDERED INTO COURT BY THE
PLAINTIFF 1-JAS MONEY OWED TO DAIRYMEN
ASSOCIATES, INC., AND WAS AN ACCOUNTS
RECEIVABLE OF DAIRYMEN ASSOCIATES, INC.
AS A MATTER OF LA\-J, IN WHICH APPELLANT
HAS A PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST SUPERIOR TO ANY CLAIM OF THE RESPONDENTS.
serkeley Bank's burden of proof in this case was to prove that it

had a valid security agreement in Dairymen's accounts receivable and
that the ~oney tendered into court by the plaintiff was owed to Dairymen
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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for milk delivered through Dairymen to Gassner.

The Appellant met

this burden of proof by uncontradicted evidence i.e.

(1)

executed by Dairymen to Appellant (EX.9 & 10, T.l46);

the notes

(2)

the securit-·
Jl

agreement wherein Dairymen granted to Berkeley Bank a security interest'
I

in all of Dairymen's accounts receivable (EX.ll, T.l46);
nancing statement (EX.l2, T.l46);
Dairymen to Gassner (EX.S

&

(4)

(3)

the fi-

the statements (bills)

6, T.l40); and

(5)

from

the testimony of Edw 1n 1"

Gossner, Jr. concerning the money tendered was based upon the statements from Dairymen to Gassner.

(T.l36.)

The Respondents did not present one shread of evidence to contrad
Appellant's showir:q of a valid security interest in this account rece:'l'
able.

The court, as a matter of law, should have found for the Appel·
1

lant.

There were no facts in dispute on this question, and the cour:

erred in allowing this question to go to the jury.

I

The court even re·

fused to instruct the jury as requested by Appellant (R.l96) that as'
I

matter of law the Appellant had a valid and perfected security intereotl
in all Of Dairymen's accounts including accounts receivable.

The Ap:oi

lant' s security agreement did, however, meet the requirements of CJt;:.
Code Annotated 70A-9-204.

There <,.;as an agreement (EX.ll)

and valued

given by Appellant (T.64-65); and Dairymen had rights in the colla:en:
i.e.; the account.

(EX.S

&

6).

Furthermore, the Appellant met the L'

ing requirements of Utah Code Annotated 70A-9-401, 402 & 403.
An account is defined in Utah Code Annotated 70A-9-ll6 as

right to payment for goods sold ... "

· ··;

The Appellant also requesteJ ,.

instruction on this def1nition •,.;hicb. •,.;as refused.

(R.l97).

Agair. t~'

evidence is clear and not d1sputed that the 531,635.29 paid b7 thei·
tiffSponsored
was byfor
milk delivered bj the Oalr .·mer C:ooperatl·;e to Gossner:
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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last 15 days of October and the first 15 days of November, 1975.
(T.44;135-l36).

l

~

Dairymen was entitled to payment for the goods it de-

livered, and the Appellant by virtue of its security interest in Dairymen's accounts and Dairymen's default on its obligations to Appellant,
is entitled to the $31,635.29 as a matter of law.
The goods delivered to Gassner by Dairymen was 823,301 pounds of

1

"Diverted and Transferred milk ..• " and 29,179 pounds of Diverted and
Transferred Butterfat ... " (EX.5

&

6, T.45).

Dairymen was entitled to

payment for this milk and sent statements to Gassner.

':1 commercial accounts receivable.

This is a classic

There is some testimony that the Res-

pondents shipped milk directly to Gessner in September, October and
November, 1975, but there is no evidence whatsoever that any of their
/ ~ilk was part of the milk delivered in October and November, 1975 by

I Dairymen to Gessner, and for which he tendered this money.
~oney

tendered by Gessner for milk delivered to him by the Respondents!

(T.l36) .
~eir

There was no

Any claim of the Respondents to this money must come through

judgments against Dairymen entered in Weber County on December 5,

1975, and by virtue of their garnishments served on Gessner Cheese Co.
The interest of the Respondents, if any, to this money, is subordinate and inferior to the rights of the Appellant.

The Appellant pro-

' perly ?erfected its security interest in Dairymen's accounts receivable
bJ filing

its financing statement (EX.l2) c.vith the Utah Secretary of

State on February 21, 1975, as evidenced on the fact of Exhibit 12 (T.66) ·
In ilal'<er Sank and Trust Co. v. Smith, 501 P.2d 639 (Nevada 1972),
•~ere t~e ~evada Supreme court recognized that the relevant provisions
:t ~r~-~1~

3 ~nder the ~tah and ~evada Commercial Codes were the same,
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the court held that the financing statement filed by Walker Bank

.

.

~nterest

specifically granted to walker a secuo.ty

.

~n

I

accounts receiv-l

I

able.

The court said that the statement which described the collateral!
.

I

as "accounts receivable" adequately descr ~bed the debtors accounts for
the purpose of perfecting a security interest therein.

The

1

I

court~~

said that the financing statement was properly filed in the State of
utah with the Secretary of State.

Smith Construction was a lien crediJ

and acquired its lien by attachment.

The court said that "it is clear

i

that a security interest which is perfected before one becomes a lien
creditor enjoys a preferred position." ld. at 642.
this case were not even lien creditors.

I

The Respondents in

1

True, they had judgments agm1

Dairymen and a garnish:nent had been served on Gessner Cheese Co. but no
I

garnishee judgment had been entered authorizing execution of the
ment.

garn11

In fact, Gessner Cheese Co. owed no monies to Dairymen, and the

1

garnishment was served on the wrong entity.

Ever assuming the status

of lien creditors, the Respondents claims to the money are inferior
subordinate as a matter of law.

1

a,1

The Trial Court erred in not grantD;

Appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict or in not granting Appellar/
[lllotion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.

This issue should ~,;j

never gone to the jury and the Trial Court erred in allowing it to ce
decided by the jury.

The Appellant is entitled to a judg;nent in its

favor as a matter of law, and respectfully requests this court ~ vK~
the judgment and award the $31,635.29 to the Appellant.
POI:'JT IB
THE FACT THAT RESPONDENTS ONLY CLA I~l TO THE
MONEY TENDERED BY PLAINTIFF WAS THROUGH DIARYMEN ASSOCIATES, INC. IS RES JUDICATA, AND THE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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JUDGt--lENTS ENTERED IN WEBER COUNTY ARE
BINDING BOTH AS TO THOSE ISSUES THAT
WERE DECIDED AND TO THOSE ISSUES THAT
COULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED.

:eiv- 1
I
I

Iter all

In November of 1975, the Respondents, in separate lawsuits,

I

'f

I

' or\

filed complaints in Weber County against Dairymen Associates, Inc. aka

also

Heber Valley Milk Co. and Gassner Cheese Company (EX.l4 &28).

The

of

I Respondent, Orval E. Petersen alleged that Dairymen • ••• is indebted
:redi~

to Plaintiff in the sum of $12,467.13 for milk purchased and delivered

:lear

i

from Plaintiff to Defendant between September and November, 1975. •

lien
\ (EX.28).

ts in

Likewise, the allegations of Respondent, E. Odell Summers, ex-

1

cept for the amount, are identical.

(EX.l4).

Both Respondents prayed

for judgment against Dairymen for their respective amounts.
but no

In a Second Cause of Action, in Weber County, the Respondents al-

I

garn11

leged that Gossner Cheese Company "received the milk Plaintiff delivered

d the
~

atus

Defendant Dairymen Associates, Inc."

I lief

(emphasis added).

The only re-

sought against Gessner Cheese Company was for a restraining order

"against GOSSNER CHEESE COMPANY from delivering monies in the amount owed
to the Plaintiff as and for milk delivered through Dairymen Associates,

:llar,:'
(EX .14

Inc."

&

28)

(emphasis added).

Judgments by Default were taken by the Respondents against Dairymen

:o ce

on December 5, 1975.

(EX.lS

&

20).

These Default Judgments were • ..•

entered against said defendant in pursuance of the prayer of said com?laint."

(EX.l5

&

20).

The Respondents later by Stipulation and Order

dismissed tjeir claim against Gassner Cheese Company with prejudice.
I EX . l 7

&

31 ) •

Respondents made no claims in Weber County against Edwin 0. Gessner

~~ n1s lndlvidual capacity.

Specifically there was no claim that these
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,,

'til

''
:':!

,,'I

Respondents were entitled to receive money directly from Edwin
Gossner or Gossner Cheese Company.

o.

No allegations were made that

there were contracts between these Respondents and Gessner, or that
they delivered their milk directly to Gossner.
At the trial in Box Elder County, however, the court, over Appellant's objections, (T.l46, 156)

allowed the Respondents to testify

that they had some kind of an agreement with Gessner whereby they delivered their milk directly to Gessner in September, October and Novem-',
ber, 1975, and were to be paid directly by Gessner.

I

The Court also al-·

I

lowed them to testify that they terminated their agreements with Dairy-)
I

men.

This testimony is completely contrary to their allegations in

their complaints in Weber County and also in their answer filed in thi:
lawsuit.

(R.34).

I

The Trial Court erred in not granting Appellant's Ho·l

tion for a Directed Verdict or for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdid
The fact that the Respondents' only claim to the money tendered was
through Dairymen, is res judicata, and the court as a matter of law, (
should have awarded the money to the Appellant because of Appellant's!
prior perfected security interest.

,

The doctrine of res judicata was properly raised by the Appellan:.l

I

In East Millcreek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 159 P.2d 863 (Utah 1940,·
as quoted in Wheadon v. Pearson, 376 P.2d 946

(Utah 1962), the utah

Supreme Court lists the elements necessary for a defense of res judic'1
in Utah.
(1)
(2)
(3)

These elements are as follows:
it must be between the same parties or privies;
it applies only where the claim, demand, or cause
of action is the same in both cases; and
the matter goes to final judgment, in other words,
a judgment on the merits.

WhenSponsored
these
elements have been met, the doctrine ~f res judicat 3
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(1)
(2)

(3)

it bars the successful party as well as the losing party
of the previous suits;
it.applies not.only.to points and issues which are actually
ra1sed and dec1ded 1n the previous suit, but also to all
points and issues that were triable in the previous lawsuit;
and
if one of the parties fails to raise any point or issue or
fails to litigate any part of his claim, demand or cause of
action, "such party may not again litigate that claim, demand or cause of action, or any issue, point or part thereof, which he could have but failed to litigate in the former action."

(See also Belliston v. Texaco, Inc. 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 1974).
The Respondents, Summers and Petersen, each received judgment against Dairymen Associates.

They alleged in their complaints that

Dairymen owed them money for milk they delivered to Dairymen and, the
District Court in Weber County granted judgments on their allegations.
It was error for the trial court in Box Elder County to totally ignore
the Weber county Judgments.

The facts decided in Weber County were

res judicata and the trial court in Box Elder County was bound by
those facts.
All the elements of res judicata as set forth above are present
in this case.

The Appellant, Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives, by virtue

of its security interest in Dairymen's accounts receivable is in privy
with Dairymen within the meaning of privity as applied to res judicata.
In Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943)

I

the utah supreme Court

gave the following definition of privity as "a mutual or successive
relationship to the same right or property.

As applied to judgments

or decrees of court, the word means one whose interest has been legally
represented at the time."

This definition is consistant with the mean-

i~g of privity applied in other jurisdictions. See, Dillard v. McKnight,
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209 P. 2d 387 (Cal. Supp. 1949); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insuranc'
company v. Salazar, 318 P.2d 210 (Cal. 1957); l'laitkus v. Pomeroy, SOo
P.2d 392 (Colo. 1972).
The key consideration to privity is that the party seeking the
doctrine res judicata either as a defense or as a sword is not a strai

i

to the previous action in that his legal interest was represented atj'
trial.

The legal interest of the Appellant, Berkeley Bank, was repre·

sented at the trial in that its position was that Dairymen did in

fac~

owe this money to the Respondents, Summers and Petersen, for milk whiq
had been delivered by Summers and Petersen to Dairymen Associates, th:
fact was

conclusi~ely

established in Weber County.

Furthermore, the Respondents filed suit against Gassner Cheese Cj
but did not allege that they were owed money by Gassner Cheese Co.

n c

failed to name Edwin 0. Gassner in his individual capacity in that 1:•
suit in Weber County.

By failing to raise any claim against Gassner
I

Cheese Co. or Edwin 0. Gassner, the Respondents should not have be~~
lowed to again litigate that claim, demand or cause of action,
issue which they could have
in Weber County.

or~.

but failed to litigate in the former act:;

The trial court by allowing the Respondents to ra1:l

these issues in Box Elder County prejudiced the rights of the ;:<pSJell·l
and the Appellant is in the position to rely on the facts conclusive.
established in Weber County.
The second test i.e. the same clai:n, demand or cause of action·
also met.

~!any different tests have been established

in ?arious jur:~

dictions to determine ·t~hat constitutes the same claim, denand or cau'·,
of action.

The Utah Case Law does however, specifica:Cl~·.

3do?t one'''
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~
5~

In re Town of West Jordan 326 P.2d 105 (Utah 1958), the Utah court
applied the test of whether the alleged rights of both actions accrued
at the same time.

The question before the court involved disconnection

he

of real property in West Jordan.

strai

in a previous disconnection suit with another City.

atj

The property owners had been involved
The court held

that res judicata did not apply because the rights involved in the two

epre· actions did not accrue at the same time.
~c~
~~

, th:

The rights o£ the Respondents which were raised at the trial in
Box Elder County did accrue at the same time as the rights conclusively
established in Weber County.

The Respondents claim to the monies in this

trial are based upon rights which accrued in September, October and
sec:

November, 1975.

It is the same milk for which they claimed in Weber

n County they were entitled to be paid by Dairymen Associates, Inc.

In

this trial, however, they claimed that they were entitled to be paid
ner

directly by Gassner for the same milk!
I

>een

·1

an;

The final element, the fact there need be a final judgment on the
merits is also met.

The Trial Court in Box Elder County denied Ap-

act:::

pellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict on the ground that the previous

r a1:l

l~wsuit resulted

I

in a default judgment and that it had never been liti-

)ell· I ;ated on the merits.

:ive.

The general rule is that a default judgment is a

final judgment on the merits for: the purposes of both res judicata and
coll=.ter:al estoppel.

Blache v. Blache, 160 P.2d 136 (California 1945);

on·

T~chnical Air: Products, Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray, Inc., 445 P.2d 426

jur::

zone. 1968); Tarnoff v. Jones, 497 P.2d 60 (Arizona. 1972); Kernan v.

cau'·,

~'

359 ?.2d 431

(Nevade. 1962).
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(Ari-

cc

The Appellant successfully raised the doctrine of res judicata,

pJ

and the trial court erred in not granting Appellant's Motion for Directed verdict and also erred in not granting Appellant's

Motion for

' fc
jl

The Respondents only claim~:

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.

the money was through Dairymen Associates and that fact was conclu- ;
sively established in Weber County.

They should not have been

L<

I tt

allo~

WE

to in Box Elder County say that that fact was not established and

a:

that they are entitled to receive their money directly from Gessner.

1

ac

They failed to raise any claim against Gessner in Weber County and

' jl

based upon the doctrine of res judicata, should have been barred frorr.

g.

raising that claim in Box Elder County.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled in several recent cases that ii,
!
I

a!

C.

parties have had an opportunity to present their case and judgment i:i

jI

rendered thereon, it is binding both as to those issues that were
tried and to those that were triable in that proceeding and the parLI

o•

are precluded from further litigating the matter.
Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 197 4)

,

In Belliston v.

i•

the Utah Supreme Court held

I

Ji

that where the opportunity does exist to raise a claim and that clai~l

t.

is not raised, that claim can not be relitigated in a separate trial.[

I

The Court's decision indicated that this is true even if the former
decision had not been on the merits.

In the Belliston case the plal··t

tiffs filed an action in the Federal District Court in 1967 againas te:.•[
Texaco, Inc. stating two counts.

11

In the first count plaintiffs

that Texaco had committed three violations of the Sherman Act.
'

In t:l
.

'

__

second count, Texaco was alleged to have engaged in price d1scnml~:
tion.

[

.j

The jury awarded damages to the ;?lain tiff on each count, tn"' ·
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J

G

court of Appeals reversed the judgment on both counts.

at a,

Thereafter the

plaintiffs initiated in the State Court an action to recover damages
Di-

' for unlawful price discrimination under Utah Law which law except for
for

1

jurisdictional requirements is substantially similar for the Federal

Lu- ;
1

Law.

The plaintiffs conceded that the substance of the state statute,

the nature of their claim, and the type and the amount of proof required

LlowEi

were sufficiently similar to those same elements under the federal act
as to raise the bar of res judicata, if the decision in the fede~al

1er. '
action had been on the merits rather than a dismissal for lack of federal
, jurisdiction.

The Utah Court then cited Wheadon v. Pearson, 376 P.2d

frorr.

946 (Utah 1962), for the proposition that the doctrine of res judicata
applies not only to points and issues which were actually raised and de-

:lt ii
cided in a prior action but also as to those that could have been ad-

1t jo1.!

judicated.
It is important to note that the Supreme Court made this ruling

JarLI

even though in the Federal Court it was held that the Court did not have

J.

:d I

jurisdiction and that there had been no adjudication by the Court or
Jury on plaintiff's claim of price discrimination.

As to this argument

:lai~l

the court said:

rial.[

"This argument does not resolve the matter, for the issue is whether

I

s~e state claim should have been asserted in the Federal action, so
that the parties were precluded from relitigating L~e claim. The re-

:::i·t

solution of this issue is contingent on whether the Federal Court had
the ;:ower to hear this state claim in judicial proceeding before it."
S2l at 380.

ner

:~lle:l
In t:

I

The Respondents had an opportunity in the Weber County cases to
~ile

a claim against Edwin 0. Gassner and to allege an agreement or an

nino·[ ~nderstanding wherein these Respondents were to be paid directly by ~r.
that

J

Gassner for any mil~ they delivered directly to Gassner.

Having failed
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to raise this claim and having claimed that the money was owed to th~
Da~

by Dairymen Associates by virtue of their delivering the milk to

I

su~

men Associates, they are precluded from raising this claim in a
sequent proceeding.

It should be noted that no claim has ever

been~

by these defendants against Gessner in his individual capacity. In fac:1
I

its interpleader action the Respondents did not make a claim against:
Gessner, having filed no counterclaim against Gessner.

The Responden

1

have agreed with Gessner that Gessner owed the money to Dairymen

I

Associates and not to these defendants because the Respondents dismid

I

with prejudice any claim they had against Gessner in the Stipulation
entered into in Weber County (EX.l7 & 31).
In summary of this ?Oint the case of Wheadon v. Pearson, Supra,:
I,

should be noted.

The Utah Supreme Court held that where the plaintitl
!

had once attempted to obtain his entire release, based on his entire!
claim, the matter should be laid at rest and the plaintiff should be
denied a second attempt at substantially the same objective under
different set of facts.

The Court cited East Millcreek Hater Co. v.

Salt Lake City, Utah, 159 P.2d 863 (Utah 1945

):

"In such case the oourts hold that the parties should litigate their
entire claim, demand and cause of action and every part, issue and
ground thereof ..• "
POINT IC
THE RESPONDENTS ARE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED
TO DENY THAT THEIR ONLY CLAHI TO THE MONEY
WAS THROUGH DAIRYMEN ASSOCIATES, INC. BY
VIRTUE OF THEIR PREVIOUS JUDGMENTS IN HEBER
COUNTY.
The case of Bernhard v. The Bank of .Z\merica, 122 P.2d 892 (19~:
the California Supreme Court, is one of the leadlng cases

o~
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res

th~

and collateral estoppel. This case held that "mutuality of estoppel"

lai 11

is not required·

ili-

by

!n

r~

fac:,

In other words, an estoppel may be raised defensively

one not a party in a prior suit against one who was a party in that

suit.

This concept has

come to be known as collateral estoppel.

It

is broader than res judicata in that it applies to a cause of action

I

1st:

different from that involved in the original action.

It is an answer,

tdenl however, in that it does not apply to matters which could have been

litigated but were not.

I

~d

The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized this distinction bet-

1

on

ween res judicata and collateral estoppel.

In Richards v. Hodsen, 485

P.2d 1044 (1971), the Court stated:
~I

i

tifj
!

re
be

!

"Since the plaintiffs herein were not parties to the former action
between defendants herein and the purchasers, they would not be
bound by any ruling made against the purchasers in the first case ••••
The defendants here were parties to the prior 3Ction and litigated
fully their claim... They have had their day in court. They have
tried that issue and now atte~t to retry it. (Collateral Estoppel)
differs from res judicata not only in the fact that all parties need
not be the same in the two actions, but also in the fact that the
estoppel applies only to issues actually litigated and not to those
which could have been determined."

v.

J~

The Appellant, Berkeley Bank, is arguing in the alternative that
the defense of collateral estoppel was raised.

The Appellant is not

abandoning its claim of res judicata or its claim that the Appellants
legal insterest was represented at the trial in Weber County.

If,

however, the court does not find that the Appellant was in privity with
the defendant, Dairymen Associates in Weber County, then the defense of
collateral estoppel is still applicable.

The Respondents are estopped as

to those issues actually litigated in the previous suit i.e. that their
:la1m that ~o~ey for milk delivered in September, October and November,
:973 was owed to them by Dairymen Associates, Inc. and not by Gossner
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nor Gessner Cheese Co.

The issue of who Summers and Petersen would

b

collect their money from was litigated and conclusively decided in

1

I

Weber County.

Had Dairymen Associates been solvent then the judgmenti

I

could have been executed upon and the Respondents would have received! C
I

their money.

Respondents should not have been allowed to come into i m

the trial in Box Elder County and additionally claim that they were
entitled to monies owed by Gassner to Dairymen Associates.

Their onl.: B

claim to the money had been conclusively established, and the Respon-1 :::

! '
dents are collaterally estopped to deny that Dairymen owed them the I 1
money .Closely related to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral

estoppel, is the fact that Respondents elected their remedy by taking' u
judgments against Dairymen.

I

The judgments taken by the Respondents

a

in Weber County were discharged, as a matter of law, in the Bankruptc:
Court at the time Dairymen filed bankruptcy in January, 1976.

c

The

Utah Supreme Court has held that when a judgment becomes discharg~r~ 1
Bankruptcy and a party has elected to take its judgment, the party h:
elected its remedy and is bound by the judgment rendered therein

U

botl

as to the issues tried and those issues which are triable and the pad I
is precluded from further litigating the matter.

c:l

National Finance

I
j r

of Provo v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 263, 382 P.2d 405 (1963).
The Respondents' judgments were discharged in bankruptcy and

~!1 P

Respondents' having elected their remedy to sue Dairymen Associates .
must abide by that decision, even though it resulted in a judgment
has been discharged in bankruptcy.

Suppose, for example, that the

'lf-l "
I

·
·
h a d no t been d1·sc!0-1.
$31
.
, 000 . 00 owe d b y Gossner To Da1rymen
Assoc1ates

1

in the Bankruptcy Court.

The Respondents would be tnecluded by the
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I

1

ld
n

by the Bankruptcy Court, under the Utah Law, from asserting the theory
1

I

menti

that they were entitled to receive their money directly from Gossner.
(The same theory they asserted in Box Elder County).

The Bankruptcy

ivedlI court would have held under Utah Law that the judgments against Dairy1

to i men would have been their remedy and they would not have been entitled
to any monies from Gassner.

re

This point is well established in the Utah

onl:' Bankruptcy Court and is based upon this case of National Finance Company

[?On· I

he

v. Daley, Supra.

The Court in Daley said that the critical question of

! importance was whether, in determining dischargeability of a judgment,
1

the court should look only to the judgment and the record of the case

eral

king' upon which it is based, or whether it should go back to the judgment

and examine issues not raised in that proceeding.

The Utah Supreme Court

took the position that the Court could look behind the judgment, but
could not go beyond the record and examine into matters not litigated
1n the action.

The Bankruptcy Court in the Federal District Court of

Utah has held that this law is applicable even though the record amounts
to a complaint and a default judgment.

Zions lst National Bank v.

Irving, No. B-74-550, December 1, 1976, United States Bankruptcy Court.
The Utah Supreme Court in Daley also again cited the generally
recognized rule of procedure that where the parties have had the op~ortunity to present their case and judgment is rendered it becomes

binding upon them, both as to the issues that were tried and those that

:s

were triable in that proceeding, and that they are precluded from further
I

litigating the :natter.

The Court then said:

"In our Judgment it better comports with the orderly processe: of
justice to require L~e plaintiff to bear the respons1b1l1ty o: pleading, ;xovi:1g and clai:ning the full benefit of '.vhatever _ch~r~cter or
cause of action he ?QSSesses in the or1ginal act1on and or oe1ng
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bound thereby, then to allow another trial~ upon the same cause of

action raising issues which could have been dealt wi~ ·in the
original action." This rule also serves the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act and at the same time leaves the way open to guard against
the discharge of debts of the character excepted from discharge if
the facts so justify. 283 P.2d at 407 (emphasis added).
The Respondents had their day in court and must bear the respons)
bility of their election.

They should not have been allowed to

pr~:

judice the rights of the Appellant to a legitimate claim against

o~d

men Associates based on its perfected security interest in Dairymen's
I

accounts receivable.

If these Respondents would not be

entitled~~

claim in the Bankruptcy Court upon their theory at the trial then

~J
I

should not be entitled to a claim as allowed by the trial court in th:l
case.

The trial court committed error in refusing to grant the Appel;

lant 1 s Motion for a Directed Verdict and the Appellant respectively

I

asks this court to reverse the judgment of the court below and enter'
judgment in favor of the Appellant as a matter of law.
POINT ID
NEITHER OF THE RESPONDENTS !<lET THEIR BURDENS OF PROOF THAT THE MONEY TENDERED BY
THE PLAINTIFF OR ANY PORTION THEREOF, WAS
MONEY OWED THEM FOR ANY MILK THEY DELIVERED
TO GOSSNER.
Both the Appellant and the Respondents assert a claim to the
monies tendered by the plaintiff, Edwin 0. Gossner.

I

The Appellants

I
I

claim to the money was based upon its perfected security interest in
Dairymen 1 s accounts receivable, and that the money tendered into couc:l
I
I

by the plaintiff, was money owed by the plaintiff to oair:;men ,;ssocJ::.
Inc· and was therefore an accounts receivable of Dairymen.

The Res?c·

dents initial claims to the money were based on their Judgments agai:.s:
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oairymen and on a garnishment served on Gessner Cheese Co.

At the

trial, however, they claimed that they were entitled to the monies
by virtue of having delivered milk in the months of September, OctoonsJ
e- :

aid
n's

ber and November, 1975 directly to Edwin 0. Gessner, and that Edwin

o. Gossner agreed to pay money to them for milk so delivered.

outset of the trial the court instructed the parties as to their re-

' spective burdens of proof.

oa
the:I
th:l

At the

The Respondents were instructed by the

Judge that they had the burden of proving an agreement existed between themselves and Gessner.

They also had the burden of proving

that the monies tendered into court by the plaintiff were monies owed
to them by virtue of having delivered milk directly to the plaintiff.
The Respondents failed to meet their burdens of proof and the
Appellant, after the Respondents had rested, moved for directed ver~ict

in Appellant's favor on the basis that the Respondents had failed

to meet their burdens of proof- (T. 207).
The Appellant introduced evidence which indicated that Dairymen
sent statements to Gossner for milk delivered in October and November,
1975. (EX. 5

,,

I

-I

in

&

6).

These statements were for milk delivered to Gossner

by Dairymen Associates for the last 15 days of October and the first
15 days of November, 1975. (T.44).
by the Respondents.

This evidence was not contradicted

Exhibit 6 shows the amount of milk delivered for

October, 1975 at 502,162 pounds of diverted and transferred milk at
$6.65 plus 17,874 pounds of diverted and transferred butterfat at 60¢.

Exhibit 5 shows that for the month of November, Gossner was billed for

3i:.31
I

delivery of 321,139 pounds of diverted and transferred milk at S6.65
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~

and 11,305 pounds of diverted and transferred butterfat at 60¢.

so

between october 15th and November 15th, Gossner received from Dairy- i
I

men, 823,301 pounds of diverted and transferred milk for a total owea I1
I

by Gossner to Dairymen of $54,749.51.

In addition, Gossner also

r~

ceived from Dairymen in this same period, 29,179 pounds of diverted
and transferred butterfat for a total owing by Gessner to Dairymen
$17,507.40.

It is important to note that these statements do not re·l

present any milk delivered in September or the first part of October,
1

1975.

The Appellant also presented testimony that the amount tenderecl

into court by the plaintiff is based on these two statements. {T.l36).
Furthermore, Mr. Gossner testified that no money was tendered into th
court for milk which was delivered directly by the Respondents to
Gessner.

He testified that if money was owed to the Respondents it

1

I

would not be paid to Dairymen Associates.

{T.l32, 140-141). This testj

mony is consistant with fact that Gessner had advanced $39,500.00
was deducted from the amount owed in the October statement.

whd

{EX.6).j

indicated in the Complaint filed by the plaintiff, the money was tende:~
I

into the Court by plaintiff because he owed the money to Dairymen's !I
I

Associates and because Gessner was served with a l'lrit of Granishment j
wherein Summers and Peterson claimed they were entitled to a portior.:l
this money by virtue of their judgments entered against Dairymen's ir
Weber County.

{R.04-05).

There is no evidence in the record to the I

contrary.
The Respondents both testified that they instructed the milk

h,;.l

George Thornley, to deliver their milk directlj to l·lr. Gessner besi.",:.i
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sometime in July of 1975.
~

given in their deposition,

This testimony contradicts the testimony
wherein they both indicated that during

.r~~ most all of 1975, the milk was picked up and delivered the same way
I

ow~

that it had been done in the previous part of 1975.

r~,

mitted that they continued to look to D~irymen Associates to be paid.

They also ad-

:ed

(T.83,84;181,184).

The Respondents were unable to introduce any evi-

•n

dence which indicated that they had reached an agreement with Gassner
re·l whereby Gessner agreed to pay them for milk which they had directly

•ber,j delivered to him.

Both Summers and Peterson indicated that they had

dH~ talked with Mr. Gessner, but Mr. Gessner was not produced and did not
136).
~

o

testify at the trial.

Any evidence concerning what he said or may have

said to the Respondents was hearsay.

The Court properly sustained the

Appellant's objection on two occasions.

(T.l65,193-194).

The Court did,

it ! however, refuse to sustain the Appellant's objection as to hearsay eviI

testj dence on page 79 of the transcript which the Appellant asserts as error

whd on the part of the Trial Court.

Aside from this hearsay testimony, the

).j

Respondents failed to meet their burden of proving that there was an

ende:~

agreement between themselves and Gessner.

In fact, Mr. Summers testi-

i
I

5

!

fied that he was paid by Dairymen for all of 1975 (T.83) and that he

I

I

ent

j was never paid by Gassner in 1975.

(T. 84).

In fact, the milk tickets

imJ

which were introduced as Exhibit 32 at the trial were on Dairymen milk

s ~

tickets.

he I

(T.l98)
1975.

h,;.l

Mr. Peterson testified that he had no agreement with Gessner
and that he was never a Gassner producer until after November,

(T.l77).
On several occasions the Appellant's counsel asked both of the

Respondents how many pounds of milk they had delivered for the months
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of September, October and November, 1975.

In each instance, the

Respondents were unable to say how many pounds of milk were
delivered.

Mr. Peterson came the closest by saying that

actual~

approxim~~

75,000 pounds of milk was delivered in October, but he did not have*
documentary evidence to prove this statement.

It is interesting

~
I

note that over 500,000 pounds of milk was delivered to Gessner in th<i
month of October and Mr. Peterson admits that he did not account for aj
of Gessner's milk.

(T.l87,197).

Furthermore, a tabulation of the mil,'

pounc.l'

receipts introduced by Mr. Summers shows a total of only 51,217
of milk which is somewhat less than the 800,000 pounds of milk
received by 11r. Gessner.

1:

E

ac~~

Even assuming that there is a claim by the.·

Respondents against Gessner, there is not any evidence to prove that
their claim is tied directly to the money tendered into Court by the
plaintiff.

I

It is obvious that the only claim Respondents have to the mon~l
tendered into Court was through their judgments against Dairymen

g

Ass) c
I

I

ciates in Weber County.

All of the evidence concerning the terminat.l

of their agreements with Dairymen and their refusal to sign

certain~

which Berkeley requested as security for the principal loan is immat;:i
The Respondents' burden was clear.

They failed to meet their burder<J

m

the Trial Court erred in failing to grant Appellant's :'-lotion for aD:·
rected Verdict at the close of the evidence.

The Appellant, on the:)

'N

b

hand, did meet its burden of proving as a matter of law that the
money tendered into Court was money owed to Dairymen and was an acco::
receivable of Dairymen.
trary.

There is no evidence in the record to the

,c-

The Appellant respectfully requests that the judgment beloVI :e,

reversed
that Law
t:-'1e
.J..ppellant
be provided
3w2rded
t:--teof Museum
monej
as aServices
matter
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JC -·

r

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING CERTAIN TESTIMONY AND IN
FAILING TO GIVE REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS OF THE APPELLANT, AND
THE APPELLANT IS, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL.
late:~

IVe

4

lowing reasons:
1.

to

I

The Appellant is entitled to a new trial for any one of the fol-

The Trial Court erred in allowing testimony as to issues which

' were res judicata, and allowing issues not raised by the pleadings to

t hEj

or aj
mil•'

ouncj'
tual

be tried over Appellant's objection;
2.

The Trial Court erred in allowing hearsay evidence as to what

Edwin 0. Gessner allegedly said to the Respondents;
3.

The Trial Court erred in giving instruction #7 and in failing

the,

to give proposed instructions of Appellant concerning definition of a

hat

security agreement (R.l94), an account (R.l97)

the

[lOndents' burden of proof.
4.

and concerning Res-

(R.203,204,205); and

The evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict.

The

grounds for a new trial are outlined in Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a

party to join a Motion for a New Trial in its Motion for a Judgment
~otwithstanding

the verdict.

The Trial Court committed error in fail-

nat;:i

ing to grant Appellant's Motion for a New Trial.

Jer<J

ments as to the specific grounds are set forth as follows:
1.

The Appellant's argu-

The Trial Court erred in allowing testimony as to issues which

were res judicata, and in allowing issues not raised by the pleadings to
be tried over Appellant's objections.

,co::

The Appellant's counsel, at page 146 of the transcript, moved the

~-

Court to strike the testimony of Mr. Summers concerning termination of
the agreement with oairymen Associates, Inc., and to strike evidence

f _,,,,

~hi:n1ng
that ~lr. Gessner owed hi;n the money directly· _;; continuing
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0b]ect 1 on as to any further
testimony
coming
in through either Mr.

Peterson or Mr. Summers was also made by the Appellant.

(T.l56).

Thi'

law of res judicata and collateral estoppel are set forth in Points
IB and IC of Appellant's Brief.

There is no need to set forth the

law again in this point, except to say that the fact that the Respondents looked to Dairymen for payment had been conclusively

est~f

lished in Weber County and to allow testimony beyond that was error. I
The testimony which was allowed to stand and to come in at a later tij
through Mr. Peterson and again through Jl.!r. Summers went beyond the fac\
I

which had been conclusively established in Weber County.

It was but

upon this evidence that the jury awarded the Verdict to the Responden·
(R.229,230).

Even though there was insufficient evidence on this

~0

the jury found that the ;noney was owed by Mr. Gessner directly to the
Respondents and that the Respondents had delivered their milk
to Gessner.

dir~~

Furthermore, the jury found that the Respondents had ter]

nated their agreement with Diarymen Associates.

The evidence was in·j

sufficient to justify this verdict, but even assuming that there was I
I

I

sufficient evidence to justify the verdict, the Trial Court should r.c:i

I

have allowed that testimony to go to the jury.

The Appellant also objected to this testimony on the basis ~M~
was beyond the pleadings filed by the Respondents.

The Answer fil~~

the Respondents indicated a claim to the money by virtue of their ju:·
ment in Weber County and by virtue of the garnishment which had beer
served upon Gessner Cheese Company.

In addition, they had dismiss~

Gessner with prejudice and had released him from any liability to pa:
any money in this law suit.

(T.lS0-151, 153-154).

The Court found t:::

the original pleadings •,;ere different from the theory which the Res·
pondents
atLibrary.
trial
Box Elder
countJ.
(T.l55).
It was er:c:
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for the Court to allow this testimony on the basis of the grounds
asserted, i.e., that the issues were res judicata or the Respondents
were collaterally estopped to raise these issues and that the issues
were not raised by the pleadings.
2.

The Trial Court also erred in allowing hearsay evidence as

to what Edwin

o.

Gossner allegedly said to the Respondents.

When Mr. Summers was testifying, he was asked whether or not he
contacted Mr. Gassner in regard to payment of the amounts due him for
milk delivered in September, October and November, 1975.

(T.79).

Mr.

Summers answered the question "yes" and then was asked by Mr. Dorius
the following question:

"What did Mr. Gossner tell you in regards to

paying you for this milk?"

The Appellant's attorney objected on the

grounds that evidence of what Mr. Gossner said coming through Mr.
Summers would be hearsay.

Mr. Dorius stated that Mr. Gossner was a

party to the action and would be a witness.
testimony.

(T.79).

The Court allowed the

Mr. Gossner was never called to testify at the trial

and it is obvious from looking at the Verdict that the jury relied upon
the inuendoes made by Summers and Peterson that Gassner had told them
that he owed them the money directly.
would account for their finding.
allowing this testimony.

There is no other evidence which

The Trial Court committed an error in

In fact, on two separate occasions the Court

sustained a similar objection made by the Appellant.
3.

(T.l65 & T.l93-l94) ·

The Trial Court erred in giving Instruction #7 and in failing

to give proposed instructions of the Appellant concerning the definition
of a security agreement (R.l94), an account (R.l97), and concerning ResiJOndent's burden of proof.

(R.203,204,&205) ·
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The Instruction #7 contains the theories of both the Appellant
and the Respondent.

The instruction to the jury as to the Respondent·

theory as stated, however, was an error.

The question of whether orl

not the Respondents, prior to September 1, had terminated any associa·
tion with Dairymen Associates, Inc. was totally immaterial to the
issues.

The question of termination of a contract is a question of 11

and there was no evidence upon which to conclude that the contract wa:'
terminated.

The only self serving statements were made by the Respor.- 1

dents that they thought they had terminated their agreement.

Even

1:

they had terminated their agreement, that fact was not material to tr.'
issue of whether or not they were entitled to receive money directly'

Septe~J~

from Mr. Gessner for milk they delivered during the months of
October and November, 1975.

This instruction led the jury to believE

that if they found there was a termination then they were also to fir:
To give the jury the I

that they were to be paid directly by Gessner.

impression that one necessarily follows the other was error and the I
Court committed error in giving Instruction #7.
The Court also failed to give Appellant's proposed instructions
concerning the definition of a security agreement.

(R.l94).

This io

simple definition of a security agreement based upon the law of the ,
State of Utah and was critical to the Appellant's theory of the case.
The Court further refused to give ;?roposed instruction found at

R.l~

concer:ning the definition of an account •.vhich is taken from the comm'"·l
under Article 9 of the Utah Commercial Code.

The Court further fall':

&

proof of the Respondents.

to Jive the jury some instrL•C>

By failing

205, concerning the burden

2

give instructions found at R.203, 204
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1

as to what the Respondents were required to prove taken together

~
1

with Instruction #7, the Court did not adequately instruct the jury.
The question of whether the Respondents terminated their agreements
with Dairymen was totally immaterial.

They either did or did not

, have an agreement with Mr. Gessner, and the money tendered into
r

1•

court was either owed to them directly or it was not.

~

question is, as set forth in the proposed instructions on Respondents'

1

The critical

Burden of Proof, is whether or not the amount tendered included any
money owed to Respondents by Gessner.

The jury should have been in-

structed on this critical question, and the Respondents' burden of
proving it.
CONCLUSION
This case should not have been allowed to go to the jury.

The

Appellant had met its burden of proving that the money tendered into
court was, in fact, an accounts receivable of Dairymen's Associates.
The Respondents failed to meet their respective burden of proof with
respect to tying in any claim to the money tendered into court by the
?laintiff.

The Appellant, based upon the grounds asserted in this

orief, respectfully ask this court to reverse the judgment entered in
' Box Elder County and award the $31,635.29 to the Appellant as a matter
of law.

In addition, the evidence presented by the respondents was in-

sufficient to justify the verdict and the Appellant, in the alternative,
therefore requests this court to grant a new trial on this ground or
~pan

other grounds which have been asserted by the Appellant.
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